Y4. F76/1:N88/12/pt.5

99th Congress
2d Session

COMMITTEE PRINT

COMPLETED

FUNDAMENTALS OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

Part V—The Internal Dynamics of U.S. Nuclear Arms Control Policymaking

REPORT

PREPARED FOR THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND SCIENCE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

BY THE

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
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JANUARY 1986

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
54-897 O WASHINGTON : 1986

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FOREWORD

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

As chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, I requested the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in August 1984 to conduct a comprehensive review and study of U.S. nuclear arms control policy and its contributions to our national security.

As part of my interest in enhancing congressional oversight of executive branch arms control policy while also encouraging my colleagues to play a well-informed and active leadership role on nuclear arms control policy issues, the committee and the CRS are sponsoring arms control workshops for Members of Congress based on the forthcoming CRS study entitled "Fundamentals of Nuclear Arms Control."

This part of the CRS study is entitled "The Internal Dynamics of U.S. Nuclear Arms Control Policymaking" and it is part of a series of committee prints. Each part will be printed individually and following completion of the comprehensive study later this year, a final cumulative committee print containing all parts will be published.

Utilizing this part of the study, the Committee on Foreign Affairs conducted an arms control workshop on June 19, 1985. At that workshop Leslie Gelb and Strobe Talbott were the guest arms control experts who were asked by the moderator, Stan Heginbotham of CRS, to present their assessments of how the arms control policymaking process works and to offer their suggestions for changes and improvements.

It is my feeling that using each part of the CRS comprehensive study as a discussion paper at the committee's periodic arms control workshops will be an effective way of learning about the contributions that arms control has made to the national security, of testing assumptions about arms control, of enhancing our understanding of this vital issue, and of brainstorming some new approaches and ideas for the future of arms control.

Congress can and must continue to provide leadership on nuclear arms control policy. Rhetorical solutions do not suffice when it comes to nuclear weapons and U.S. national security. Congress must be prepared to offer constructive nuclear arms control solutions that are based on the fundamentals of nuclear arms control. It is my hope that this comprehensive study will make a noticeable contribution to that effort.

The views expresed in this report are those of the Congressional Research Service and do not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

DANTE B. FASCELL, *Chairman.*

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LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
Washington, DC, October 15, 1985.

Hon. DANTE B. FASCELL,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am pleased to submit "The Internal Dynamics of U.S. Nuclear Arms Control Policymaking," a study in the continuing series entitled "The Fundamentals of Nuclear Arms Control," as requested by the committee.

The enclosed study examines domestic politics and bureaucratic conflict in the formulation of U.S. arms control policy since the late 1950's. Case studies of several arms control negotiations are considered: The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963; SALT I; SALT II; and START and INF in the first Reagan administration. Each case is examined with regard to policy formulation, the political environment surrounding the decision to negotiate, and the overall structure of decisionmaking and bureaucratic conflict. The effect of the domestic environment and the bureaucratic structure on negotiations is also assessed.

This report was prepared by Dr. Robert C. Gray, Consultant to the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division. Production support was provided by Gail Coppage. The series is being coordinated by Leneice N. Wu, Specialist in International Relations, under the direction of Stanley J. Heginbotham, Chief.

Sincerely,

GILBERT GUDE, *Director.*

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PREFACE: SUMMARY OF THE ARMS CONTROL WORKSHOP ON INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF U.S. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL POLICYMAKING

The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House or Representatives held its fifth in a series of arms control workshops on June 19, 1985. The workshops are sponsored by the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and they are coordinated with the comprehensive CRS study on the fundamentals of arms control requested by Chairman Dante B. Fascell. The fifth workshop focused on the internal dynamics of U.S. nuclear arms control policymaking.

The workshop moderator was Stanley J. Heginbotham, Chief of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division at CRS. He introduced Dr. Robert C. Gray, a consultant for CRS. Dr. Gray presented a brief summary of this paper, "The Internal Dynamics of U.S. Nuclear Arms Control Policymaking." Dr. Gray stated that in arms control policymaking, the key leadership role resides in the Office of the President, either with the President or with his National Security Advisor.

Two models of arms control policymaking were described. The first has involved the direct intervention of the President into the process; Kennedy and Carter are examples. The second model has depended on a strong National Security Advisor such as Henry Kissinger. Neither of these models has guaranteed success, however. For example, Kissinger's method can be judged to have involved bypassing the arms control bureaucracy, thereby causing conflict. If power is too concentrated in the National Security Advisor, the final results may not be in the best overall interest of the United States. President Carter's involvement can be viewed as resulting in delays which caused ratification difficulties for SALT II. It can be concluded, therefore, that White House authority in the arms control process is a necessary but not sufficient condition for successful arms control policymaking.

The first Reagan administration can be described as having an arms control policy process in which the President's hold on the process was too loose with no strong National Security Advisor to tighten the grip. It remains to be seen whether the second Reagan administration will have an arms control policymaking process in which the President or his National Security Advisor takes the lead.

Other complications in the arms control policymaking process were also outlined. There are many competing institutional organizations, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). The influence and position of each organization varies from administration to administra-

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tion, based on the personalities of the primary actors. Presidential elections also affect policymaking. The difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of forming a national consensus on arms control issues can also complicate the arms control policymaking process.

The experts for the fifth workshop were Leslie Gelb and Strobe Talbott.

During the discussion some characteristics of an effective National Security Advisor on arms control were mentioned: He should be knowledgeable about arms control; he should have power within and over the bureaucracy; and he should have the power to deal directly with Soviet representatives. The role of Congress was also discussed. It was felt that the primary action of Congress should still remain to be advise and consent. There was extensive discussion concerning the problems Congress faces regarding treaty ratifications and opinionmaking on arms control issues.

The role of ACDA was also considered and many comments pointed out that ACDA has not been able to fulfill its original intention of being a counterweight to the Departments of State and Defense on arms control issues. ACDA's Director was described at one point as not being the chief arms control negotiator, but rather the "point of the spear" in policymaking because no other organization has a strong bureaucratic interest in arms control.

A national consensus on arms control was discussed and generally viewed as essential but difficult. The public's ignorance on the subject of arms control was seen as allowing public opinion to be too easily manipulated by competing authorities. Therefore, greater public education about arms control was viewed as important and necessary for successful arms control policy implementation.

The questions and discussion were wide-ranging, touching upon partisanship, the superpower rivalry and arms control, the effect of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) on the arms control process, and the importance of maintaining a hard target kill capability.

There seemed to be agreement that effective arms control depended upon the President having firm control over the arms control policymaking process. Congressional pressure for arms control agreements were generally viewed as appropriate and more public education on arms control was seen as important and necessary.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report considers case studies of the most significant arms control negotiations of the past 25 years: The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963; SALT I; SALT II; and START and INF in the first Reagan administration. The purpose of the report is to examine the role of domestic politics and bureaucratic conflict in the formulation of U.S. arms control policymaking since the late 1950's.

A common framework is used for each case study. In an initial section on policy formulation, the political environment surrounding the decision to negotiate is described, as is the overall structure of decisionmaking (and bureaucratic conflict). In a second section, the effect of the domestic environment and the bureaucratic structure on negotiations is assessed.

The Limited Test Ban Treaty

A nuclear test ban was discussed with the Soviets in both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, although a treaty was not concluded until 1963. There are a number of reasons why the Kennedy administration succeeded where the Eisenhower administration failed. First, the Kennedy administration had a foundation on which to build—a foundation laid during the Eisenhower administration, which took the first steps toward negotiating with the Soviets on nuclear testing. In doing so a number of technical problems were identified and addressed, thereby reducing the technical challenges facing Kennedy. Negotiating lessons were also learned.

A second difference between the two administrations is that while Eisenhower faced opposition from OSD, JCS, and AEC, virtually all of Kennedy's advisers were in sympathy with the goal of a test ban. Moreover, while Eisenhower—at least until 1959—seemed unable or disinclined to impose order on the warring factions within his government on the issue of arms control, Kennedy was personally involved in the negotiations and in maintaining control of his government on arms control issues.

The success of the 1963 negotiations also reflected the international environment. Whereas the U–2 incident effectively ended the chances for an agreement in 1959, the Cuban missile crisis, by dramatizing the dangers of the nuclear age, may have served as an impetus for an agreement.

As in other successful negotiations, the 1963 test ban resulted from an internal environment sufficiently harmonious to permit the conclusion of a treaty (and its ratification) and an external environment conducive to an agreement.

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SALT I

During the negotiation of SALT I, the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency generally favored arms control agreements, while the Department of Defense was rather more skeptical of them. Policy differences between bureaucracies charged with different missions are an enduring feature of modern American government. What changes from administration to administration is how such differences are managed. The approach adopted by Nixon and Kissinger was to dominate policymaking by centralizing SALT decisionmaking in a verification panel chaired by Kissinger. More than this, Kissinger succeeded in gaining control of the all important interagency policy machinery.

The Nixon administration succeeded in reaching an agreement with the Soviets and in securing Senate ratification of the ABM treaty. The agreement was in part the product of Henry Kissinger's private negotiations with Soviet leaders—negotiations that were undertaken without the knowledge of the SALT delegation or the relevant bureaucracies in Washington. Negotiating in the absence of technical support, Kissinger complicated the task for the SALT delegation which had to translate his conceptual understandings into a treaty or an agreement.

Ratification was accompanied by congressional assertion of expectations for SALT II, in the form of the Jackson amendment calling for equal limits on U.S. and Soviet forces in future agreements. This measure was in part a consequence of Kissinger's negotiating methods. A perception arose among some that the Soviets had gotten the better of the United States in SALT I, and this perception would haunt SALT II. To the extent that Kissinger's private negotiating style contributed to the asymmetries which were seen to favor the Soviets, one can conclude that Nixon and Kissinger complicated the domestic environment for follow-on agreements.

SALT II

The Carter administration inherited from the Ford administration a treaty at least half-completed. It had a group of experienced policymakers who were in basic agreement on the desirability of reaching an arms control agreement with the Soviets. Subcabinet posts were staffed with likeminded people. And the President himself was committed to the effort and willing to focus on the complex issues at hand. The prospects for arms control, however, were not as bright as this brief summary might suggest.

First, the political environment in the nation was less conducive to Soviet-American arms control than it had been in 1972. Second, there were differences among President Carter's advisors which, at a minimum, affected the pace of the SALT process. These involved both tactical differences (what proposals or concessions to make and when) and a broader philosophical divide between Zbigniew Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance concerning the proper direction of U.S.-Soviet relations.

The Carter administration completed a treaty with the Soviets in June of 1979. Before it could be ratified, however, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan forced the administration to request that the Senate suspend its consideration of the treaty.

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That the treaty was not completed until 1979 is due in part to the fact that the Carter administration chose in 1977 to embark on an approach that differed significantly from the previous administration.

The March 1977 comprehensive proposal was a major departure from previous approaches in SALT. At a general level, it is an example of an administration seeking to pursue a distinctively new approach, to achieve an intended goal, rather than continue with the policies it inherited. In this case, however, the result was a delay, exacerbated by internal differences and bureaucratic conflict. The principal significance of the delay is that by the time the treaty was completed, the international and domestic environments had evolved in ways that made ratification more difficult than it would have been if the treaty had been finished earlier.

START AND INF

The first Reagan administration ended with no new agreements with the Soviets. In part this was the fault of the Soviets. The focus in this report, however, is on the impact of U.S. actions. That no agreement was reached was in part a function of the disorder in the Reagan administration and in part a reflection of the administration's policy of building up U.S. military capabilities prior to and as a basis for arms control negotiations. The source of both factors seems to be the President himself. Reagan appeared at various times to be less in control of his government and less knowledgeable about the major issues at stake in arms control than other Presidents discussed in this report. Moreover, in the first term at least, he lacked a national security adviser with knowledge or clout sufficient to permit Presidential delegation of responsibility for imposing control. This may well indicate that the President attached a much higher priority to strengthening U.S. military capabilities than looking for avenues to reach an arms control agreement in the first 4 years. In the absence of central direction, however, the "cacophony of vested interests" that Alexander Haig has described will dominate, as occurred from 1981 to 1985.[1]

CONCLUSIONS

Because of the many variables and unique circumstances of each negotiation, one must be cautious in drawing broad generalizations. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that this report focuses only on American internal and domestic factors. A successful negotiation, of course, requires a negotiating partner who is also willing (and able) to compromise in search of an agreement and an absence of major disruptions external to both.

One key lesson emerging from this report concerns the role of White House leadership. The government consists of a number of separate agencies that bring varying and sometimes conflicting perspectives to issues such as arms control. In the absence of leadership from the President, a strong national security adviser, or some other central figure backed with Presidential authority, it is

[1] Haig, Alexander M. Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy. New York, MacMillan, 1984, p. 223.

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unlikely that a negotiating position (or an agreement with another nation) will be reached.

Two models of White House leadership can be identified. The first is one of direct Presidential involvement. Having familiarized themselves with the details of the negotiations, Kennedy and Carter were personally involved in monitoring progress in the test ban and SALT II. The second model is one of a strong national security adviser who is invested by the President with sufficient authority to impose order on the government. Henry Kissinger under Richard Nixon is the preeminent example of this.

Neither of these approaches to White House control guarantees success. In the Carter case, for example, sufficient authority was exercised by the President such that agreement with the Soviets was reached, but there were delays in the process that pushed the ratification debate into a difficult political period. In the Kissinger case, the national security adviser circumvented the bureaucracy by secretly negotiating with the Soviets. Without benefit of thorough staff analysis, he agreed to positions that complicated subsequent negotiation of both SALT I and SALT II.

If White House control is not a sufficient condition of success, however, it may be a necessary one. In the Eisenhower and first Reagan administrations, the lack of White House authority (whether exerted by the President or a powerful subordinate) allowed the warring factions to delay and obstruct the formulation of negotiable proposals. By the time Eisenhower, over the objections of DOD and AEC, finally seemed willing to commit Presidential resources to the negotiation of a test ban, it was too late. In the first Reagan administration, the vacuum at the top in knowledge and experience, coupled with the evident lack of priority the President attached to arms control, enabled or required Assistant Secretaries to formulate policy. Because it is generally easier to prevent the government from acting than it is to cause it to act, it is no surprise that intelligent, politically sophisticated officials are capable of obstructing the negotiating process.

The issue of White House leadership poses a dilemma. On the one hand it seems necessary to bring order to the government. On the other hand it is subject to abuse. If, for example, power becomes so concentrated in the person of the national security assistant that he can negotiate without technical support or policy input from the departments, the negotiating process may actually be made more complex. Or—in a worst case—agreements may be reached which, because they have not been thoroughly studied by the relevant departments, may not be in the best interest of the nation.

In addition to such problems as controlling the various agencies of government, there is a more fundamental point that seems to be the unique province of American democracy. Quadrennial Presidential elections pose a number of complications for many foreign policy ventures, including arms control negotiations.

One such complication is the temptation for an incumbent to conclude an agreement before the next election so as to enhance reelection prospects (Nixon in 1972) or to establish his place in history (Johnson in 1968). This temptation may at times be a significant negotiating liability, for if (as seems almost certain) the nego-

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tiating partner perceives the quadrennial dynamic, it may, by waiting until the fourth year of an administration, be able to extract concessions otherwise unobtainable. The opposite problem is one in which the advent of an election year makes conclusion of an arms control agreement politically impossible. Challenged from his right by Ronald Reagan in 1976, President Ford was in no position to move forward with SALT that year. The manner in which elections affect negotiations is determined by the passions and issues of the day. What is recurrent is the interjection of election year politics into arms control (and other) negotiating forums.

A second broad complication created by a democratic form of government is that competitive elections often feature promises of change. Ronald Reagan ran openly against SALT II, a treaty already signed by the United States and Soviet Presidents. The measured approach adopted by the Reagan administration in developing new proposals reflected its judgment that the top priority was building up U.S. military strength, not ratifying SALT II or proceeding quickly to negotiation of another agreement. The Carter March 1977 comprehensive proposal is another example of an administration attempting to distinguish its efforts. Such policy shifts from one administration to the next make it difficult for the United States to follow a coherent medium-term (let alone, long-term) strategy, an unpleasant fact that at times gives our adversaries tactical advantages in the conduct of diplomacy.

Because arms control has become such a controversial issue in American political life, it is particularly susceptible to the problems discussed above. In the absence of a national consensus on the proper foreign policy objectives of the United States, the policy oscillations experienced in recent years may continue. Although questions of bureaucratic organization matter a great deal (and to some extent reflect the wider debate in society), the most significant question facing the United States in the near future is whether it is possible to construct elements of a national consensus on the interrelated issues of arms control and force modernization.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This study examines domestic politics and bureaucratic conflict in the formulation of U.S. arms control policymaking since the late 1950s. Case studies of the most significant arms control negotiations are considered: the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963; SALT I; SALT II; and START and INF in the first Reagan administration.

Each case is approached in terms of a common framework. In an initial section on policy formulation, the political environment surrounding the decision to negotiate is described, as is the overall structure of decisionmaking (and bureaucratic conflict). In a second section, the effect of the domestic environment and the bureaucratic structure on negotiations is assessed.

The U.S. machinery for policymaking in national security and arms control consists of a number of departments and agencies that usually have initially conflicting assessments of the appropriate course of action. A central theme of this study is that, in the absence of some coordinating force (e.g., a President who takes a special interest, a strong Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, etc.), the various agencies may well be unable to come to sufficient agreement to permit the formulation of a successful negotiating position.

The Presidency is the focal point of activity in the executive branch. It is the President (or his designee) who chooses the key officials of the executive branch and who establishes the policy and management style of his administration. The President and his closest advisers are in theory able to transcend the more narrow horizons of the various departments and agencies, bringing a national perspective to the issue at hand. On issues of national security and arms control, the principal adviser to many recent Presidents has been the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. President Reagan downgraded this position in 1981, and the first two individuals who served him had less Presidential access than their predecessors in the 1960s and 1970s. The incumbent, Robert McFarlane, seems to have the combination of knowledge and access which is prerequisite to being a powerful NSC adviser, although his role is still in transition at this writing.[1]

The Department of State is a major actor in arms control because of its central role in conducting diplomatic relations between the United States and other nations. Secretary of State George Shultz has reportedly forged a close working relationship with McFarlane.[2] Within the State Department, the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and the European Bureau are most directly concerned with U.S.-Soviet arms control talks. In general, the Reagan

[1] Gelb, Leslie H. Taking Charge: The Rising Power of National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane. New York Times Magazine, May 26, 1985.
[2] Ibid., p. 31.

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State Department has reflected the normal institutional perspective of the Department over time by viewing arms control negotiations in a more positive light than the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) or the Reagan Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

The Department of Defense contains both civilian leaders—in OSD—and military leaders—in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The positions of these two sets of actors do not always coincide.

The arms control position of OSD has varied over time. OSD lacks the enduring organizational interests characteristic of many other agencies. Instead, OSD positions tend to reflect the ideological predilections of the incumbent administration. Under Eisenhower, for example, OSD opposed a test ban, while under Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's leadership in the Kenneth administration it favored one. OSD was skeptical of arms control in the Nixon and Ford administrations, but a key supporter of SALT II in the Carter period. Under Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, OSD has been skeptical if not hostile towards arms control. The principal entity within OSD charged with formulating arms control positions is International Security Policy (ISP).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have also played a variable role, although it has been one of greater acceptance of arms control than conventional wisdom would suggest. In the Eisenhower years the JCS aligned with OSD in favor of continued atmospheric testing, although they ended up supporting the Test Ban Treaty in 1963. In the Nixon administration the Joint Chiefs did not support the positions of OSD, favoring instead the approach of State and ACDA—an agreement limiting offensive launchers and ABMs. In the Carter administration the JCS supported the SALT II treaty, a position they maintained into the Reagan years. In 1982 the Joint Chiefs (holdovers from the Carter administration) supported the more moderate of the START positions under consideration by the Reagan administration. President Reagan has now had the opportunity to choose his own Chiefs, and it remains to be seen what position the new JCS takes in future arms control decisions. One possible explanation for the greater support for arms control from JCS than from OSD is that uniformed military planners like to build as much certainty into their calculations as possible, and carefully constructed arms control agreements provide a more stable environment than an open-ended arms race.

The final organization to be considered is the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Created in 1961, ACDA is under the general supervision of the Secretary of State and was designed to bring an arms control perspective into the government. It conducts research on and provides advice about arms control. In the Nixon and Carter administrations, the Director of ACDA also served as the chief negotiator in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Perhaps because of the controversial development of arms control issues in recent years, there have been contentious debates in the Senate over confirmation of ACDA Directors. Conservative Senators opposed the nomination of Paul Warnke in the Carter administration, while many supporters of arms control opposed the nomination of Kenneth Adelman in the Reagan administration.

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Like OSD, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is very sensitive to the ideological predispositions of the incumbent administration. Under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, ACDA took a pro-arms control position, as it did during the first Nixon administration. After SALT I was ratified, however, the agency, probably at the instigation of Senator Henry Jackson, was purged of personnel thought to have been associated with features of the treaty that the Senator found objectionable.[3] In the remaining Nixon years and in the Ford administration, ACDA frequently lined up with OSD in an attempt to prevent Henry Kissinger from concluding a SALT agreement. When President Carter came into office, he staffed ACDA with advocates of arms control, only to be followed by President Reagan, who appointed as his first ACDA Director one of the leading critics of SALT II. ACDA has not lived up to its promise. It normally lacks the budget and bureaucratic clout to be a major actor. These deficiencies can be overcome only if a President chooses to place one of his key advisers in the ACDA Director's position. That has not happened in the current administration.

[3] Smith, Gerard. Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I. Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1980, p. 444; Clarke, Duncan. The Politics of Arms Control: The Role and Effectiveness of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmanent Agency. New York Free Press, 1979, pp. 80–81.

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II. THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY: 1958–63

The Eisenhower Administration

POLICY FORMULATION

Political environment

On November 1, 1952, the United States exploded the first hydrogen bomb. The first Soviet hydrogen bomb was detonated on August 12, 1953. Along with the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union set off hundreds of test explosions in the ensuing years. Because hydrogen bombs were thousands of times more powerful than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, their testing became a potent symbol to critics of nuclear weapons. Because the hydrogen bombs were exploded above ground, thereby adding radioactive debris to the atmosphere, H-bomb tests also became a subject of concern to some people who were concerned less with international relations than with public health.

The nuclear testing issue was introduced into partisan politics in 1956 when the Democratic candidate for President, Adlai Stevenson, advocated the cessation of nuclear tests. Although Stevenson's speeches raised public consciousness about nuclear testing, they were of little apparent assistance to him in an election which President Eisenhower won by a landslide.[1]

Public concern over nuclear testing grew in 1957 as the press continued to discuss the issue and as congressional committees held hearings which highlighted health hazards. Although expert scientific opinion was divided on how serious the hazards were, by the spring of 1957, 63 percent of the respondents in a Gallup poll believed that the United States should stop testing if other nations did so as well.[2]

The Eisenhower administration also faced international pressure to end testing. World leaders and some 9,000 scientists from 43 nations called for an end to testing.[3] The testing issue was further complicated by Soviet public statements that seemed to welcome some variety of suspension of nuclear testing. There was, thus, a danger that continued U.S. refusal to end tests would benefit the Soviet Union in the ongoing contest for world opinion.

Bureaucratic conflict

In April of 1958 President Eisenhower shifted the American position, which had previously linked a nuclear test ban to a broader

[1] The best study of the domestic politics of nuclear testing is Divine, Robert A. Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954–1960. New York, Oxford University Press, 1978.
[2] Ibid., p. 139
[3] Seaborg, Glenn T. Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban: Berkeley, University of California Press 1981, p. 8.

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disarmament agreement. Dropping the linkage, the President wrote Premier Nikita Khrushchev proposing a conference of technical experts to determine what kind of inspection system would be needed to monitor a test ban.[4] The Soviets accepted the offer, and preparations began for the Conference of Experts, which was to meet in Geneva on the first of July.

This policy shift resulted in part from organizational changes within the Eisenhower administration. Prior to 1957, scientific advice to the President was largely filtered through Lewis Strauss, head of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). An opponent of a test ban, Strauss saw to it that scientists who shared his view briefed the President. After the Soviet launching of Sputnik in October of 1957, Eisenhower appointed a special assistant for science and technology, James Killian, and a President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). This group was more favorably inclined toward suspending nuclear tests, and from this point forward President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles received advice that reflected the diverging views within the scientific community on the wisdom and feasibility of a test ban.[5]

In decision-making terms, the most interesting aspect of the new proposal was that it was made without formally or officially consulting the agencies that had a continuing interest in and responsibility for nuclear testing.[6] In this instance, Eisenhower and Dulles acted virtually alone, thereby denying opponents of a test ban the opportunity to construct bureaucratic obstacles to the new initiative.

To facilitate U.S. preparations for the Conference of Experts, a Committee of Principals was formed. It consisted of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Director of Central Intelligence, and the Special Assistant for Science and Technology. Seconded by a Committee of Deputies (subordinate officials of the same principals), the Committee of Principals was formed "to coordinate the executive branch's review of arms control policy." [7] The basic structure of a Committee of Principals seconded by a Committee of Deputies lasted into the Kennedy administration and the successful negotiation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.

The bureaucracies serving President Eisenhower differed sharply over the need for continued tests and the wisdom and feasibility of their cessation, and the new organizations became important battlegrounds for a divisive policy debate. The Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission took the lead in arguing for continuing testing. The civilian and uniformed leaders of the Pentagon were united on this point. Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy and his successor Thomas S. Gates thus worked with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in underscoring the reasons against a test ban.

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[4] Divine, Blowing on the Wind, pp. 210-211; Jacobson, Harold Karan and Eric Stein. Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians: The United States and the Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1966, pp. 49-50.

[5] Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, p. 10; Divine, Blowing on the Wind, pp. 208-212.

[6] Divine, Blowing on the Wind, p. 211; Jacobson and Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians, p. 473.

[7] Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, pp. 37 and 49; Jacobson and Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians, pp. 85-86.

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The AEC was a consistent advocate of continued testing both under Lewis L. Strauss and John A. McCone. Scientists at AEC laboratories were also prominent among those opposed to the cessation of testing. Edward Teller of the Livermore Laboratory was especially prominent in this regard.[8]

The advocates of a test ban included Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, his successor, Christian Herter, and Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles. The President's science adviser, James Killian, and his successor, George B. Kistiakowsky, also supported a ban.[9] As time passed, President Eisenhower himself became sympathetic to the idea of a test ban. In describing the President's decision to propose the Conference of Experts in 1958, for example, Robert Divine wrote that Eisenhower "had always had strong reservations about the wisdom of unrestricted nuclear testing. He found the views of Killian and the PSAC congenial, and his own military background made him relatively impervious to the dire warnings of the Pentagon. For Eisenhower, the clinching factor was world opinion." [10] Although Eisenhower was moving toward negotiations with the Soviets, those in his administration who opposed the idea were able to delay progress in that direction.

IMPACT ON NEGOTIATIONS

The principal impact of the policy dispute within the Eisenhower administration was to prevent coherent decisionmaking on arms control. Although in 1958 President Eisenhower was leaning toward a test ban, he did not move decisively to impose his view on his subordinates. Jacobson and Stein concluded that due to the serious differences between the various agencies, "when policy was made by committee, as it usually was, the result tended to be a compromise which straddled the issues and occasionally contained contradictory elements. . . . In addition, under the Eisenhower administration, largely because of the deep divisions of opinion, decisions were taken at an extremely slow pace." [11]

The Conference of Experts, itself a result of an Eisenhower-Dulles initiative that bypassed the bureaucracy, led to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. A tripartite forum involving the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, it first met on October 31, 1958. President Eisenhower also instituted an American moratorium on further tests. Much of the debate in 1958 and 1959 centered on how the United States could verify compliance with a treaty that banned all nuclear tests. This was an important issue because of the difficulty of distinguishing between underground explosions and earthquakes. When negotiations bogged down, internal debate turned to how long the United States should observe the self-imposed moratorium.

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[8] Ambrose, Stephen F. Eisenhower: Volume Two—The President. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1984, pp. 563–565; Divine, Blowing on the Wind, pp. 219 and 283–284; Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, pp. 33–34.

[9] Ambrose, Eisenhower, pp. 447–454 and 565; Divine, Blowing on the Wind, pp. 219 and 284–285; Jacobson and Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians, pp. 471–472.

[10] Divine, Blowing on the Wind, p. 212.

[11] Jacobson and Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians, pp. 471–472.

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Although he still favored a comprehensive test ban, President Eisenhower wrote Chairman Khrushchev in April of 1959 proposing an alternative of progressing "in phases, beginning with a prohibition of nuclear weapons' tests in the atmosphere." [12] Rebuffed by the Soviets, Eisenhower made a similar proposal in February 1960. This time, however, underground tests measuring above 4.75 on the Richter scale were to be banned in addition to atmospheric tests.[13] To this proposal, the Soviets responded affirmatively—on the condition that the "United States agree to a moratorium on tests below the 4.75 limit for an indefinite time." [14]

Such a moratorium would have been unsupervised, for the technical resources for identifying small underground explosions did not exist. Because of this, "Eisenhower was bombarded with advice to reject any unsupervised ban out of hand—he got it from the Defense Department, the JCS, the AEC, newspaper editorials, and politicians." [15] Rejecting this advice, the President announced to the National Security Council on March 24 and to the public on March 29 his acceptance in principle of the Soviet proposal. Eisenhower's most recent biographer concluded that "[n]ever before had the Russians and the Americans been so close to agreement." [16] They would come no closer under Eisenhower, for the downing of a U-2 over the Soviet Union led to the breakdown of the May 1960 summit in Paris.

From 1958 through 1960, the bureaucratic forces within the Eisenhower administration were structured for stalemate. Even with a President willing to accept in principle ideas designed to move toward a test ban, little was accomplished in the actual negotiations. If the U-2 had not been shot down, there is no guarantee (even assuming Soviet willingness to reach an agreement) that negotiations would have been successful.

When the President met with key advisers after the March 24 NSC meeting, he encountered John McCone arguing that acceptance of the moratorium was "a surrender of our basic policy." He encountered DOD representatives insisting that the Soviets would not abide by the agreement. In subsequent days Edward Teller and other scientists testified before the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy on the perils of the proposed agreement.[17] In short, if serious negotiations had not been aborted by the U-2 and the Paris summit, President Eisenhower would have faced numerous disagreements among his subordinates as the details of an agreement emerged.

The organizational structure and leadership personalities of the Eisenhower administration built delay into the system. "The Committee of Principals reached decisions through consensus, not voting. Eisenhower preferred, even insisted upon, agreement. When presented with conflicing views, he generally called for further

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[12] Eisenhower letter to Khrushchev as quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower, p. 523. Senator Albert Gore had proposed a similar idea as early as November 1958. Jacobson and Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians, pp. 126-127.
[13] Divine, Blowing on the Wind, p. 297.
[14] Ibid., p. 299.
[15] Ambrose, Eisenhower, p. 565.
[16] Ibid., pp. 565-566.
[17] Ibid.

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study to resolve the matter." [18] It is unclear whether attempts by opponents of a test ban to delay and dilute could have prevented the conclusion of a treaty if the U-2 incident had not occurred. What is clear is that those opponents did succeed in delaying negotiations earlier in the Eisenhower administration. By the time Eisenhower imposed some order on his government and an agreement was in sight, the political environment was not conducive to negotiations.

The Kennedy Administration

Policy formulation

Political environment

President John F. Kennedy inherited a test moratorium from the Eisenhower administration and the negotiating legacy (and lessons) of the 1958–1960 period. He was not, however, under pressure from public opinion to reach an agreement. Attitudes had changed since 1959, when 77 percent of the people in a poll favored extending "the agreement to stop testing H-bombs." [19] A July 1961 poll, for example, indicated that the respondents favored unilateral American resumption of testing by a majority of more than two to one.[20]

Like Eisenhower, Kennedy was under continuing pressure from British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and other world leaders to move toward a test ban, and interest groups such as SANE were active in attempting to mobilize anti-nuclear sentiment. This pressure was mitigated somewhat, however, by the fact that it was the Soviet Union that resumed atmospheric testing on September 1, 1961. American underground tests were resumed on September 15, 1961. Atmospheric tests were not resumed until April 1962.

The moratorium, begun by the United States in 1958 for a period of one year, had been extended by Eisenhower until the end of 1959. In late 1959, the President announced the end of the moratorium but pledged that there would be resumption of testing without advance notice. When Kennedy took office, neither side had resumed testing. A number of explanations have been offered for the Soviet resumption in 1961. By that fall, Soviet leaders may have been concerned about the military balance and may have wanted to put themselves in a position to negotiate from strength. The Chinese had been criticizing the Soviets for their policy of peaceful coexistence, and resuming atmospheric tests could be expected to strengthen the Soviet image. The reasons given by the Soviets centered on the refusal of the Western powers to accept Soviet proposals for disarmament and on French nuclear tests (which the Soviets charged were being encouraged by the other Western powers).[21]

One key difference between the environments faced by Eisenhower and Kennedy was the source and intensity of partisan opposition to a test ban. Under Eisenhower much opposition to a test ban had come from the Democratic controlled Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Under Kennedy a principal source of opposition

[18] Clarke, Politics of Arms Control, pp. 13–14.
[19] Divine, Blowing on the Wind, p. 291.
[20] Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, p. 73.
[21] Ibid., pp. 77–78 and 84.

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(when negotiations became serious) was the ranking Republican member of this Committee, Representative Craig Hosmer. To coordinate and highlight opposition to a test ban, the Republicans established a Conference Committee on Nuclear Testing chaired by Hosmer.[22]

Perhaps the most important difference between Eisenhower and Kennedy was the depth of the latter's commitment to achieving a nuclear test ban and his willingness to structure a government in which arms control agreements could be reached. As Theodore Sorensen wrote, "since the day of [Kennedy's] inauguration, a test ban had been his principal hope for a first step toward disarmament and other pacts." [23]

Bureaucratic conflict

Personnel and organizational changes made by Kennedy contributed to the successful completion of a test ban treaty in 1963. The new Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and the new science adviser, Jerome B. Wiesner, viewed a test ban in positive terms. But, then, so had their predecessors in the Eisenhower administration. President Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, was much more powerful than his predecessors in the Eisenhower adminsitration, and he too was a supporter of arms control and of the test ban. Kennedy appointed Glenn T. Seaborg to chair the Atomic Energy Commission and Robert S. McNamara to serve as Secretary of Defense. Seaborg and NcNamara supported the test ban in 1963. Their predecessors in the Eisenhower administration almost certainly would not have done so.

The most visible organizational change initiated by President Kennedy was the creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in 1961. Although its first years of existence were spent in part struggling to be accepted as a participant in the policy process, ACDA and its first director, William Foster, did play a role in the test ban negotiations.[24]

The Committee of Principals and Committee of Deputies remained the organizational centers of arms control policy coordination in the Kennedy administration. William Foster became an informal participant in 1961. In 1963 the ACDA director and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were made formal members of the Committee of Principals.[25]

The Committee of Principals was chaired by the Secretary of State. The Committee of Deputies was chaired by Adrian Fisher, Deputy Director of ACDA. As the most authoritative academic study of ACDA concluded:

> The Committee of Deputies was somewhat more active than the Committee of Principals. Fisher usually called its meetings, and he was supported by ACDA's staff, which could set the agenda for the Committee of Principals and could initiate interagency studies. . . . The Committee of Principals received specific directives from Kennedy and played a useful coordinating role on test ban deliberations.[26]

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[22] Jacobson and Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians, pp. 436–438.
[23] Sorensen, Theodore C. Kennedy. New York, Harper & Row, 1965, p. 727.
[24] Clarke, Politics of Arms Control, pp. 70–71.
[25] Ibid., p. 71.
[26] Ibid.

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The net effect of the personnel and organizational changes under President Kennedy was to create a climate in which there were fewer obstacles to the successful completion of a test ban treaty than had been the case under Eisenhower. This reflected the personal commitment of the new President. "Kennedy personally directed U.S. efforts toward the Partial Test Ban Treaty. He involved himself in the minutiae of the negotiations, pressured the bureaucracy, and acquired considerable expertise on the subject." [27] Thus, when, in the spring and summer of 1963 the prospects for an agreement improved, the American Government was prepared to act.

IMPACT ON NEGOTIATIONS

The Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests was replaced in March 1962 by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) as the forum in which test ban negotiations were conducted. In August the United States tabled two draft treaties. One proposed a ban on tests in the atmosphere, in the oceans, and in outer space. The second proposed a comprehensive ban, one which necessitated some on-site inspection. The Soviets rejected both proposals.[28] Despite this rejection, American proposals continued to take this dual form into the final round of negotiations, which eventuated in the limited ban in 1963.

In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis there was little movement in the ENDC. In April of 1963, President Kennedy, acting on the advice of British Prime Minister Macmillan, sent to Khrushchev a joint U.S.-U.K. letter designed to break the impasse. The two leaders expressed their willingness to "send in due course very senior representatives who would be empowered to speak for us and talk in Moscow directly with you." Khrushchev accepted and eventually set July 15 as the date for the meeting.[29]

In order to create a positive environment for the meeting Kennedy decided ("without any recommendation from the departments or consultation with the Congress") on a unilateral suspension of American atmospheric tests so long as other nations refrained from such tests.[30] He announced this decision in a June 10, 1963, speech at American University—an address explicitly designed to put U.S.-Soviet relations in a more cooperative context. One of the most noted speeches of the postwar era, the American University speech was written by Sorensen without soliciting "official departmental positions and suggestions." [31] In order to build support for the imminent negotiations, the White House circulated a memorandum to various officials on the day after the speech entitled "How We Hope the President's Speech at American University May Be Understood." [32]

Although ACDA Director William Foster had represented the United States at the ENDC in early 1963, when it came time to assemble a delegation for the new negotiations, President Kennedy

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[27] Ibid., p. 63.
[28] Jacobson and Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians, pp. 386–389.
[29] Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, pp. 208–213.
[30] Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 730.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, pp. 216–217. Seaborg reproduces the text of the memorandum.

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chose Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman to head it. Sorensen reports that Kennedy did so because Harriman was the President's "favorite trouble-shooter," and because he wanted "to underline the importance he attached to the new three-power talks, and to increase the prospects for success." [33] The principal task facing the administration then became deciding on the position the delegation would take in Moscow. In the American University speech Kennedy had announced that "discussions will shortly begin in Moscow looking toward early agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty." The United States had, as noted above, already tabled both a draft comprehensive and a draft partial test ban treaty at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference. As Glenn Seaborg, a participant in the preparations for the Harriman mission, reports, however, it became clear in mid-June "that there was a surprising amount of disagreement within the administration itself about the acceptability of the proposals we had ourselves advanced at Geneva." [34]

According to notes taken by Chairman Seaborg, a June 14 meeting of the Committee of Principals focused on the draft comprehensive treaty. On behalf of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor argued that because the Soviets might be able to cheat without detection, the treaty "was not in the security interests of the United States." Negative views of AEC laboratory directors and scientists were also reported. Secretary McNamara made it clear that he supported the draft treaty, and ACDA director Foster expressed consternation that objections were being raised about "agreed government positions . . . reached last summer and again in February." Taylor seemed more supportive of an atmospheric ban than a comprehensive one.[35] After a June 21 meeting, Seaborg reports that "the basic issue of whether Harriman would negotiate on the basis of the West's 1962 draft treaties appeared to have been settled in the affirmative." [36] In the absence of further documentation, one might conclude that President Kennedy decided to move forward in spite of the reservations of the JCS and some AEC scientists.

A final attempt to obstruct negotiations was made by the JCS on July 9 at a White House meeting to complete Harriman's negotiating instructions. On July 2, Khrushchev had made a speech in Berlin indicating Soviet interest in an agreement ending tests "in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water." Probably because of the new possibility of a limited rather than a comprehensive ban, General Taylor now suggested reopening a study of "whether an atmospheric test ban was to the advantage of the U.S." Kennedy, McNamara, and Rusk all indicated that it was too late for such a review.[37]

In a less decisive administration, the JCS objections might have delayed negotiations. In this case, however, Harriman was sent to Moscow with instructions to seek a compenhensive ban. If that

[33] Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 734.
[34] Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, p. 220.
[35] Ibid., pp. 220-222.
[36] Ibid., pp. 223-224.
[37] Ibid., pp. 227-229.

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could not be achieved, he was to seek a partial ban of tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space.[38]

During the negotiations, Kennedy restricted distribution of cables from Harriman to only six top civilian officials outside the White House. In addition, Kennedy approved communications to the delegation in Moscow. Sorensen reports that often the President, "altered or rewrote completely the daily cable of instructions prepared in the Department of State." [39]

The negotiations resulted in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. Completed on July 25, signed on August 5, it was ratified by the Senate on October 10, 1963.

There are a number of reasons why the Kennedy administration succeeded where the Eisenhower administration did not. First, the Kennedy administration had a foundation on which to build—a foundation laid in the Eisenhower years. It was the Eisenhower administration that took the first steps toward negotiating with the Soviets on nuclear testing. In doing so a number of technical problems were identified and addressed, thereby reducing the technical challenges facing Kennedy. Negotiating lessons were also learned. The Conference of Experts, for example, was largely devoid of political guidance. It was viewed simply as a forum for technical specialists, even though decisions made there had political consequences. The final negotiation of the Test Ban, by contrast, was headed by a generalist and kept under tight political control.

A second difference between the two administrations is that while Eisenhower faced opposition from OSD, JCS, and AEC, virtually all of Kennedy's advisers were in sympathy with the goal of a test ban. Moreover, while Eisenhower—at least until 1959—seemed unable or disinclined to impose order on the warring factions within his government on the issue of arms control, Kennedy was personally involved in the negotiations and in maintaining control of his government on arms control issues. In the Kennedy years, only the JCS and some AEC laboratory scientists remained skeptical of the test ban, and, without other allies, the Joint Chiefs eventually supported the treaty. The new bureaucratic actor created under Kennedy, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, played a role in preparing American positions, although in this period the new agency was struggling to establish itself and did not play a key role in the final outcome. Kennedy staffed the government with people who were sympathetic with what he wanted to achieve and he exerted control over the government and the negotiations.

The success of the 1963 negotiations also reflected the international environment. Whereas the U-2 incident effectively ended the chances for an agreement in 1959, the Cuban missile crisis, by dramatizing the dangers of the nuclear age, may have served as an impetus for an agreement.

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[38] Ibid., p. 229.

[39] Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 734. For a description of the negotiations based on cables obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, see Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, pp. 235-253.

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As in other successful negotiations, the 1963 Test Ban resulted from committed executive leadership sufficiently harmonious to permit the conclusion of a treaty (and its ratification) and an external environment conducive to an agreement.

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III. SALT I

Policy Formulation

POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

The success of the 1963 test ban negotiations led the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense to view arms control agreements as desirable. Secretary of Defense McNamara has said that he became "convinced around the time of the partial test ban treaty that [the United States] should accept more of the risks arising from arms limitation." [1] This was an important development, for as John Newhouse has noted, ACDA lacked the policy influence to generate support for strategic arms control in the Johnson administration. Thus it was only "when the Defense Department was able to show that various goals could be better achieved by limiting some systems and cancelling others that restricting strategic arms became respectable, even important." [2]

This section focuses on the negotiation of the SALT I treaty by the Nixon administration. It is necessary, however, to briefly discuss preparations for strategic arms control talks in the Johnson administration, for these preparations constituted a part of the political and bureaucratic environment in which the Nixon administration considered strategic arms control in 1969.

In the spring of 1968, President Johnson directed his subordinates to develop an arms control proposal that could be presented to the Soviets before his administration ended. With only a few months in which to forge a position, the Committee of Principles and the Committee of Deputies were circumvented because of fear that these interagency bodies would not be able to develop a proposal that was acceptable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thus it was that Morton Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning and Arms Control, came to chair a "SALT Committee" in the Defense Department which contained representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other DOD agencies. Halperin "worked privately with a few collaborators in ISA [International Security Affairs], ACDA, and State to develop negotiating provisions that had a fair chance of gaining military approval." [3] These proposals were presented first to the "SALT Committee" and then to the Joint Chiefs before formal presentation to the Committee of Principals.

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[1] Newhouse, John. Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973, p. 69.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Rosenthal, Burton R. Formulating Negotiating Positions for SALT: 1968, 1969–72. Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (Murphy Commission). Vol. IV, Appendix K, Adequacy of Current Organization: Defense and Arms Control. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, pp. 328–329. (Cited hereafter as Rosenthal (Murphy Commission), Formulating Negotiating Positions.)

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By mid-August a proposal acceptable to the major actors was ready. It was presented to President Johnson as a package. In contrast with President Nixon, who wanted numerous options presented for his consideration, Johnson wanted advance bureaucratic agreement on a proposal that he could approve. As one analyst put it, the "Halperin/ISA *tour de force* was exactly what Lyndon Johnson wanted. It provided him with a proposal for some degree of arms control, i.e., essentially a freeze on long-range offensive missiles mixed with a little regulation of defensive ABMs. It also won the approval . . . of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." [4] The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia led to the cancellation of the planned arms talks. But an important precedent had been set. The proposal agreed upon in 1968 "put both military and civilian officials on record that the security of the United States would be enhanced by the negotiation of an arms control proposal." [5]

When the Nixon administration took office there was little public or congressional pressure for arms control. Attention focused instead on the Vietnam War. President Nixon and his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, took a measured approach to renewing the Johnson administration's attempt to begin arms control talks. They moved decisively, however, in establishing White House control of the decision-making process. A system of NSC-initiated interagency studies (National Security Study Memorandums or NSSMs) was created. The subjects and terms of reference of these were set by Henry Kissinger and his staff. After options were generated by the bureaucracy, a National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) might be issued announcing the policy decided on by the President.

There were those in the bureaucracy who wanted to move early on SALT. With the NSSM system described above, however, the analytical work that would precede a Presidential decision on arms control could not begin in earnest until a NSSM was requested on the topic. This did not occur until March 1969, at which time ACDA was put in charge of NSSM 28, a study of arms control options. Kissinger did not yet have sufficient power to take charge of such studies himself. As work on NSSM 28 proceeded, however, Kissinger was able to take increasing control of the SALT process.[6]

BUREAUCRATIC CONFLICT

It had been skepticism in military circles about "arms controllers" in ACDA which led to the establishment of the Halperin working group in 1968. Similarly, in 1969, the military, now joined by the White House, was suspicious of ACDA and the NSSM 28 role assigned to it. Because some of the people who formulated the 1968 proposal were still in official positions, it was possible that an interagency process chaired by ACDA would result in resubmitting the 1968 proposal. Nixon and Kissinger did not welcome this prospect, for they did not want a "hand-me-down SALT position." [7]

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[4] Gottemoeller, Rose E. Evolution of the U.S. Organizational Setup for Dealing with SALT. RAND Paper P-6197. November 1978, p. 5; Wolfe, Thomas W. The SALT Experience. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger, 1979, pp. 23-25.

[5] Rosenthal (Murphy Commission), Formulating Negotiating Positions, p. 331.

[6] Newhouse, Cold Dawn, pp. 146-149.

[7] Rosenthal (Murphy Commission), Formulating Negotiating Positions, p. 334.

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John Newhouse concluded that at this point, "[b]ureaucratically, SALT was a mess. . . . As one official recalls the moment, 'ACDA tried hard but didn't have the clout to shake loose the necessary paper from the Pentagon.'" [8]

While NSSM 28 was underway, a dispute over intelligence estimates of Soviet MIRV capabilities arose. Kissinger used this dispute as the occasion to set up a special MIRV panel, chaired by himself, to examine the issue. When the completed NSSM 28 was presented to the NSC in June 1969, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff complained about the quality of the analytical work on verification. ACDA Director Smith suggested creation of a high-level group to deal with such issues. The MIRV panel became a model for this second, higher-level body—the Verification Panel—which replaced the ACDA-chaired NSSM 28 group as the primary vehicle for SALT issues. In essence, Kissinger took advantage of this opportunity to move control of the SALT process into the White House by establishing himself as chairman of the Verification Panel.[9]

The Verification Panel was supported by the Verification Panel Working Group consisting of representatives of each of the principals except the Attorney General. One analyst has concluded that "[t]he 'VP-WG' setup proved very efficient in bringing to the President a whole range of negotiating options. The SALT bureaucracy was at last centered in the White House, but only because of an ACDA retreat from its basic legislative mandate." [10] While this judgment may be accurate, it fails fully to reflect the situation that ACDA faced. Institutionally weak, ACDA had never been able to compete as an equal with State and DOD. And, in the Nixon administration, Kissinger managed to outmaneuver even these more powerful actors.

The SALT negotiations opened on November 17, 1969. The U.S. delegation was headed by ACDA Director Gerard Smith. Also in the delegation were Paul H. Nitze representing the Office of the Secretary of Defense, General Royal B. Allison representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dr. Harold Brown representing the scientific community, and Llewellyn E. Thompson (succeeded by J. Graham Parsons in 1971) representing the Department of State. In addition to the five delegates, there was an executive secretary, Raymond L. Garthoff, who was a career Foreign Service Officer. Communications between Washington and the delegation were channeled through the SALT Backstopping Committee, which consisted of individuals from the agencies represented on the Verification Panel Working Group.[11]

The bureaucratic struggle during the SALT I negotiations has been discussed by a number of authors. John Newhouse, for example, wrote that "[i]t is within the two capitals that the critical bargaining—the struggle to grind out positions—lumbers endlessly, episodically on. The marrow of SALT is found in the contesting views and clashing organizational interests of government agen-

[8] Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 159. Also see Clarke, Politics of Arms Control, p. 35.
[9] Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 162.
[10] Gottemoeller, Evolution of the U.S. Organizational Setup, p. 11.
[11] Wolfe, The SALT Experience, pp. 32 and 306.

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cies." [12] Similarly, the SALT-I negotiator, Gerard Smith, has observed that while "SALT policy was made through the NSC system, the parochial interests of the agencies in good measure shaped the final product." [13]

The literature on SALT I generally depicts the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as favoring arms control agreements and the Department of Defense as being rather more skeptical of them.[14] Gerard Smith reports that "most officials in ACDA" were interested in establishing a ceiling on offensive weapons and in setting some limitations on anti-ballistic missile systems (ABMs).[15]

In the Defense Department, on the other hand, there were differences of opinion between civilian officials and uniformed officers. The policy inclinations of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) are subject to change as administrations change, with OSD agencies generally reflecting the views of the incumbent Secretary of Defense and his principal subordinates. Few of the officials in OSD in the Nixon administration had the enthusiasm for arms control that OSD displayed under President Johnson. In the Nixon period, the influence of International Security Affairs (which was the source of the Halperin proposal in 1968) diminished. Systems Analysis and Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) both influenced the OSD position in SALT. Indeed, DDR&E competed with CIA in projecting future Soviet capabilities (with DDR&E providing "the gloomiest estimates . . . ").[16] Some in OSD sought to negotiate limits on the payload and reductions in the number of Soviet launchers. Ambassador Smith found this "effort to restructure the Soviet missile forces to more nearly resemble the American force structure" as "an impractical proposition." [17]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were willing to go along with SALT, but, like ACDA officials, they had a more modest agenda than some in OSD. As Gerard Smith put it: "While leery of any arms control agreement, the Chiefs were persuaded that a simple first agreement placing ceilings on offensive launchers and ABMs could be in the United States' interest. Had the Chiefs supported the positions of the civilian officials in the Defense Department, I doubt that the 1972 SALT agreements would have been reached." [18]

Policy differences between bureaucracies charged with different missions are an enduring feature of modern American government. What changes from administration to administration is how such differences are managed. The approach adopted by Nixon and Kissinger was, as suggested above, to dominate policymaking by centralizing SALT decisionmaking in a Verification Panel chaired by Kissinger. More than this, Kissinger succeeded in gaining control of the all important interagency foreign policy machinery. As will be illustrated in the next section, he used the "back channel" to

[12] Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 32
[13] Smith, Gerald. Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I. Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1980, p. 113.
[14] See, for example, Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 36.
[15] Smith, Doubletalk, p. 114.
[16] Newhouse, Cold Dawn, pp. 36-38.
[17] Smith, Doubletalk, p. 114.
[18] Ibid.

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negotiate with the Soviets without the knowledge of the SALT delegation.

In his memoirs Kissinger describes how Nixon came to rely on him for "the tactical management of foreign policy." Kissinger recognizes that his solitary management style, which sometimes involved excluding the responsible officials from ongoing negotiations, demoralized bureaucracies and made it difficult to construct a consensus around the fruits of his secret negotiations. He defends his acts by noting the eccentricities of Richard Nixon:

> These extraordinary procedures were essentially made necessary by a President who neither trusted his Cabinet nor was willing to give them direct orders. Nixon feared leaks and shrank from imposing discipline. But he was determined to achieve his purposes; he thus encouraged procedures unlikely to be recommended in textbooks on public administration. . . . It was demoralizing for the bureaucracy, which, cut out of the process, reacted by accentuating the independence and self-will that had caused Nixon to bypass it in the first place. But it worked. . . . In 1971 and 1972 these methods produced the SALT breakthrough, the opening to China, a Berlin agreement, the Peking and the Moscow summits without any setback. The results should be judged on their merits, though I recognize a price was paid in the manner of their achievement and though I do not believe it should be repeated.[19]

Not surprisingly, those who were bypassed by Kissinger take a different view. In commenting on the Kissinger style, Gerard Smith has written that a—

> * * * serious flaw was that Kissinger, as the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, director of the NSC staff, and chairman of the Verification Panel, had too much influence. I must say that he had us all buffaloed. Nothing could go forward without his approval . . . . At times, he seemed to be the only one in the cast of SALT characters who was free to take initiatives. Presumably he was at all times consulting with the President and merely passing on his wishes, but it seemed quite clear that Kissinger was often acting as a principal, not an agent.[20]

Kissinger and Smith are in basic agreement that in a wide variety of circumstances Kissinger could act on his own authority. They are also in agreement that this management style should not be repeated. Where they differ is in their assessments of whether the achievements under Kissinger's methods were worth the price paid, and in their descriptions of what the price was. Kissinger suggests that the price was mainly organizational—demoralization of the bureaucracy. As is discussed in the next section, others (including Smith) have concluded that the price was substantive—that by negotiating on occasion without benefit of expert staff, Kissinger made decisions that complicated the negotiation of SALT I and left a bitter legacy for SALT II.

Impact on Negotiations

Although the negotiating record is not yet available for analysis, there are several good accounts of SALT I. These accounts make it clear that Kissinger's personal domination of the negotiations had a significant impact, although there is disagreement about the nature of that impact. This section will approach this topic by way of a brief case study—the issue of how (if at all) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) would be dealt with in a treaty.

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[19] Kissinger, Henry. White House Years. Boston, Little, Brown, 1979, p. 806.

[20] Smith, Doubletalk, pp. 109–110.

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A central issue in SALT I was what systems would be included and what kinds of limits would be placed on them. The category of offensive weapons of most concern to the U.S. side was ICBMs, for the Soviets were deploying large throw-weight missiles such as the SS–9. Unconstrained deployment of these missiles might enable the Soviets to threaten U.S. land-based missiles at some point in the future. The U.S. delegation was also concerned about the Soviet SLBM force. It, too, was in the midst of modernization and expansion, and there was no desire on the part of the delegation to conclude an agreement that exempted this category of weapon. For these reasons, U.S. proposals had included limits on ICBMs, submarines, and SLBM launcher tubes.

By the end of 1970 the SALT negotiations were deadlocked over the Soviet desire to include American forward-based systems in Europe and the American position that both offensive and defensive systems should be addressed. In January 1971, Kissinger began discussing the stalemate with the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin. This and other communications between Kissinger and Soviet representatives and leaders constituted the famous "back channel." Knowledge of these secret dealings was restricted to President Nixon and, perhaps, a small number of Kissinger White House aides.[21]

The back channel negotiations led to an exchange of letters between President Nixon and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and a May 20, 1971 announcement by Nixon that the U.S. and Soviet Governments had agreed to seek an ABM agreement and "certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons."[22] In essence, the Soviets had agreed to simultaneous negotiations on offensive and defensive weapons while agreeing for the moment to exclude American forward based-systems. The United States moved away from its insistence on equal numbers of offensive weapons, thereby "conceding the Soviet Union a three-to-two edge in ICBMs."[23] Whether SLBMs would be included—and how they would be dealt with—became the subject of discussions in the ensuing year.

In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger argues that the eventual SALT–I agreement confirmed what the May 1971 understanding implied. In listing the important implications of the 1971 understanding, Kissinger asserts that "we had put [the Soviets] on notice that submarine-launched missiles would have to be limited or accounted for."[24] On this point judgments differ. John Newhouse, who was apparently granted access to White House sources to prepare his book, wrote that "SLBMs and strategic bombers were neither included nor excluded from the terms of the back-up letter or the Kissinger-Dobrynin negotiating history."[25] Similarly, Raymond Garthoff, Executive Secretary of the SALT delegation, wrote that the Soviets were "told that SLBM launchers could either be or

[21] Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 203.
[22] Kissinger, White House Years, p. 820; Nixon, Richard M. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, v. I. New York, Warner Books, 1978, pp. 648–649.
[23] Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 218.
[24] Kissinger, White House Years, p. 820.
[25] Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 219.

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not be included." [26] SALT I negotiator Gerard Smith has also described Kissinger's omission of SLBMs. When the Soviets asked if SLBMS were to be frozen along with ICBMs, Kissinger told them that the United States would "be prepared to have it either way." As Smith put it:

> Here, in one sentence, the position which the United States had pressed for almost a year was changed. There is no evidence to indicate that this major change in SALT policy was ever considered in advance by anyone except Kissinger—and perhaps not even by him. It may well have been a random answer of a fatigued and overextended man who did not realize the immense significance of his words. It was to take a lot of effort and expenditure of bargaining power to redeem these words and restore the earlier U.S. position that SLBMs must be included in any SALT agreement.[27]

The Soviets finally agreed to include SLBMs in April 1972 in a secret Moscow meeting between Kissinger and Brezhnev. The Soviets drove a hard bargain, insisting on high limitations which permitted them an advantage in allowable SLBM launchers.[28] The May 1971 understanding which excluded SLBMs was negotiated by Kissinger without the benefit of normal staff work. Similarly, the April terms of inclusion were the result of solitary action. As Smith put it, "[a]gain there had been no preparations for this negotiation in the National Security Council machinery, no building blocks or Working Group consideration, no Verification Panel meetings or consultations with allies." [29] It was left to the SALT delegation to turn the understanding reached in Moscow into an actual agreement. In the end, the SLBM issue was not resolved until the Moscow Summit, where Nixon and Kissinger, without the benefit of the SALT delegation (which was kept in Helsinki) agreed to allow the Soviets to exclude from the SLBM baseline 60 launchers on G-class diesel submarines.[30]

Raymond Garthoff has explained that the SLBM outcome "did not create any serious military disadvantages." [31] But a price was paid in terms of support for future SALT agreements. Garthoff has argued, for example, that the negotiations by Nixon and Kissinger in Moscow—

> contributed greatly to subsequent loss of credibility and doubt over SALT and detente because of the secret and haphazard way they were concluded, and also because of the political oversell of the Moscow Summit. Indeed, they represented a model of how not to conduct negotiations—against a political deadline, by an ill-prepared political negotiation team (and without the best technical negotiating advice and assistance), seeking unattainable objectives, and then settling for murky and ambiguous cosmetic formulations to cover over the situation.[32]

Similarly, Seymour Hersh, in his critical account of the Kissinger years concluded that "[b]y not revealing that he had conceded the Soviets a bonus in submarines and submarine launchers to obtain the SLBM agreement, Kissinger left SALT I open to allega-

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[26] Garthoff, Raymond L. Negotiating With the Russians: Some Lessons From SALT. International Security, v. 1, spring 1977, p. 9.
[27] Smith, Doubletalk, pp. 228-229.
[28] Garthoff, Negotiating With the Russians, p. 15.
[29] Smith, Doubletalk, p. 271. For Kissinger's account, see White House Years, pp. 1148-1150.
[30] Smith, Doubletalk, pp. 419-430.
[31] Garthoff, Negotiating With the Russians, p. 16.
[32] Ibid., p. 17.

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tions that the Soviets had deceived the United States about such basic issues as the number of their strategic forces." [33]

The system created by Nixon and Kissinger worked in that a treaty was negotiated, signed, and ratified by the United States Senate. However, ratification was accomplished by congressional assertion of expectations for SALT II. This assertion—in the form of an amendment by Senator Henry Jackson calling for equal limits on United States and Soviet forces in future agreements—was in part a consequence of Kissinger's negotiating methods. A perception arose among some that the Soviets had gotten the better of the United States in SALT I. It was a perception that would haunt SALT II. To the extent that Kissinger's personal negotiating style contributed to the asymmetries which seemed to favor the Soviets, one can argue that Nixon and Kissinger complicated the domestic environment for follow-on agreements.

[33] Hersh, Seymour M. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. New York, Summit Books, 1983, p. 557.

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IV. SALT II

Policy Formulation

POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

When Jimmy Carter was inaugurated in 1977 he pledged to "move this year a step toward our ultimate goal—the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this earth." The most obvious forum for pursuing this goal (however overstated in the inaugural) was that of SALT II, the negotiation of which Carter inherited from his predecessor. Though put on hold by the election of 1976, the SALT II negotiations had produced the Vladivostok Accord and some 50 pages of draft treaty agreed upon by the Americans and the Russians.[1] Despite this inheritance, almost two and one-half years would pass before the SALT II treaty was signed in Vienna. The delay in completing the treaty was significant, for by the fall of 1979 numerous forces had converged to diminish the prospects for ratification. In late 1979, President Carter asked the Senate to postpone action on the Treaty. While events outside the United States (e.g., Soviet negotiating intransigence) contributed to the delay in concluding SALT II, changes in the domestic environment also lengthened negotiations. One goal of this section is to illuminate the sources of delay.

Although public opinion in 1977 was supportive of arms control in general, there was little awareness of SALT in particular. After reviewing some of the evidence, one author concluded that in 1977 "SALT was not an important or familiar issue to the American people." [2] More striking than public opinion on arms control was increased support for higher defense spending during the election year of 1976. The defeat in Indochina and the growing perception that the Soviet Union rather than the United States had profited most from detente had an impact on the public.[3] Changing attitudes were also visible in Congress, altering the dynamics of executive-legislative relations on arms control and defense.

In 1972, President Nixon could, as a Republican, count on the support of some conservatives in his party who were fundamentally skeptical of arms control agreements, while Democrats who opposed Nixon on many other issues were for the most part supportive of arms control. Thus, Nixon avoided a partisan debate on SALT I. As a Democrat, Jimmy Carter would have no such

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[1] Wolfe, The SALT Experience, p. 219.

[2] Platt, Alan. The Politics of Arms Control and the Strategic Balance. In Blechman, Barry M., ed. Rethinking the U.S. Strategic Posture: A Report From the Aspen Consortium on Arms Control and Security Issues. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing, 1982. p. 157.

[3] Barnet, Richard J. Real Security: Restoring American Power in a Dangerous Decade. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1981, pp. 50–51.

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luxury.[4] In the period since 1972, moreover, there had been considerable erosion in congressional support for SALT.

This erosion had actually begun during the SALT I debate in Congress when Senator Henry M. Jackson succeeded in obtaining passage of an amendment to the joint resolution approving the Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms. Jackson disliked the terms of the Interim Agreement allowing the Soviets a higher number of ICBM and SLBM launchers. His amendment specified that future agreements should provide for equal limits for both sides.

Concerns such as Jackson's that the United States was neither responding to the build-up of Soviet strategic forces nor obtaining a fair bargain in SALT mounted after 1972, and led to the formation (in 1976) of the Committee on the Present Danger. Its principal purpose was to warn of the Soviet military build-up and to argue for increased defense spending to counter it. The group was also active in opposing SALT. One of the most influential members was Paul Nitze, who had resigned from the SALT II delegation in 1974. The formation of such groups added a new dimension to the political environment in which SALT was being negotiated.

The most graphic indication the Carter administration had that critics of arms control had to be taken seriously was the battle over the confirmation of Paul Warnke as Director of ACDA and as chief negotiator of SALT. Nitze and other critics testified against Warnke's confirmation. Although Warnke was confirmed as SALT Ambassador by a vote of 58–40, some Senators voting against confirmation said that the outcome showed that there were enough votes to defeat SALT II.[5]

BUREAUCRATIC CONFLICT

During the 1976 Presidential campaign, Jimmy Carter made a number of statements indicating dissatisfaction with the policy-making process in the Ford administration. Most significantly, he criticized the excessive power and penchant for secrecy of Henry Kissinger. With specific reference to arms control, Carter criticized the changes in ACDA that came in the wake of SALT I and promised to "revitalize" the agency.[6] In organizing both the general machinery of national security policy and the specific organs dealing with arms control, Carter responded to the deficiencies he saw in the previous administrations.

Thomas Wolfe depicted the scope of the changes under Carter:

> The advent of the Carter administration in January 1977 brought the first substantial changes in about eight years in the U.S. government's organizational arrangements and operating practices for the conduct of SALT. Perhaps the major

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[4] Bresler, Robert J. The United States and Arms Control. In Gray, Robert C., and Stanley J. Michalak. American Foreign Policy Since Detente. New York, Harper & Row, 1984, p. 22.

[5] Clarke, Politics of Arms Control, pp. 182–185.

[6] Ibid., p. 66. Apparently in response to Senator Jackson's belief that "arms controllers" at ACDA and State were responsible for the deficiencies he saw in the SALT I agreement, the Nixon administration removed two of the principal SALT actors from arms control responsibilities: the State Department's Raymond Garthoff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff's General Royal Allison. Gerard Smith resigned as chief negotiator. And ACDA was "purged" of numerous officials. Smith writes that "[o]f the seventeen people in ACDA's top positions in 1972, only three were left by 1974. In 1973 the ACDA budget was cut by a third and it lost 50 of its 230 employees." The result was a significant change in ACDA's role. Under the directorship of Fred Ikle, ACDA sided with the Defense Department on many arms control issues. On these points, see Smith, Doubletalk, p. 444; and Clarke, Politics of Arms Control, pp. 80–81.

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change lay in moving away from the centralized and tightly controlled NSC system over which Henry Kissinger presided during the Nixon-Ford period toward a much less structured system. . . .[7]

In organizational terms, the Verification Panel was replaced by the Special Coordinating Committee (SCC). Although chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and retaining SALT responsibilities similar to that of the Verification Panel, the SCC operated differently from its bureaucratic predecessors. Zbigniew Brzezinski served more as a "referee among bureaucratic equals, rather than the dominant framer of policy." [8]

One of the most important differences between the administration of Jimmy Carter and those of Nixon and Ford was the sharing of power among several knowledgeable and experienced policymakers in the Carter years. National Security Adviser Brzezinski played an important although not decisive role. He did not, for example, engage in negotiations with Soviet representatives as Kissinger had done. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, and chief SALT negotiator and ACDA Director Paul Warnke had all worked together in the Defense Department in the 1960s and thus had some common basis on which to build (although this did not prevent differences from arising between Brown on the one hand and Vance and Warnke on the other).

Secretary Vance came to play a leading role in the negotiations, especially in back-channel meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. (Unlike back-channel meetings of the Kissinger era, these were not kept secret from the SALT delegation or other government officials.) Brown, a member of the SALT I delegation (and of the 1958 Conference of Experts) was, in the words of Strobe Talbott, "the President's single most trusted adviser on SALT." [9] Warnke's dual role (which Gerard Smith had had but which was denied to Smith's successor under Nixon and Ford) brought ACDA more to the center of power than at any other point in its history. On some key issues such as verification, Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner was also an important player.

Another difference between the Carter administration and its most recent predecessors was the attitude of the President. Neither Johnson, Nixon, nor Ford was involved in the details of arms control. (In the case of the Limited Test Ban, Kennedy had been.) Brzezinski describes Carter's efforts in 1978:

> From April on, Carter came to commit an inordinate amount of time to the SALT effort. . . . He carefully monitored the work of the SCC . . . He would review carefully the instructions that I would send to Paul Warnke. . . . He would meet with the JCS in order to solicit their support . . . he also engaged himself in direct talks with Ambassador Dobrynin. . . .[10]

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[7] Wolfe, The SALT Experience, p. 28.

[8] Ibid., p. 36. The Verification Panel Working Group was replaced by the SALT Working Group, while the SALT Backstopping Committee continued its work in much the same way as in the past.

[9] Talbott, Strobe. Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II. New York, Harper & Row, 1979, p. 193.

[10] Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981. New York, Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983, p. 166. On Carter's personal involvement, also see Talbott, Endgame, pp. 3-4.

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Much of what has been described so far might lead one who did not know the outcome to predict that the Carter administration would have been successful in its efforts to reach an arms control agreement. It inherited a treaty at least half-completed. It had a group of experienced policymakers who were in basic agreement on the desirability of reaching an arms control agreement with the Soviets. Sub-cabinet posts were staffed with like-minded people. And the President himself was committed to the effort and willing to focus on the complex issues at hand. What, then, obstructed the effort?

As suggested earlier, the political environment in the nation was less conducive to Soviet-American arms control than it had been in 1972. Two public opinion analysts described the U.S. mood in the mid- to late-seventies in terms of "a new desire to put an end to what is seen as weakening of the U.S. role in the world, and to resume the position of being 'number one.'" [11] In this context the Carter administration's unilateral cancellation of the B-1 bomber program, closing of the Minuteman missile production line, and decision not to deploy the enhanced radiation (neutron) warhead intensified the fears of those who saw a weakened America. One analyst has concluded that these decisions "dissipated significant congressional and public confidence in [the Carter administration's] toughness and reliability on national security issues," thereby making it more difficult for the administration to credibly argue on behalf of SALT II.[12]

In addition, there were differences among President Carter's advisers which, at a minimum, affected the pace of the SALT process. This was not the usual struggle between a pro-arms control State/ACDA faction and a Defense Department anti-arms control one (although on some issues familiar bureaucratic differences did emerge). Instead, there were, within the framework of overall agreement on the goal of arms control, disagreements at the tactical level—what proposals or concessions to make and when. President Carter, in his memoirs, notes that "some of the issues [in SALT] were extremely controversial among my own advisers, and very difficult for me to resolve. There was no one else to make a final decision, and sometimes I had to spend many hours learning about the more contentious points." [13]

In addition to the tactical disputes, there was a broader philosophical difference between Zbigniew Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance that surfaced from time to time—a difference in perspective which President Carter never seemed to fully resolve. Indeed, the Brzezinski-Vance dispute overshadowed the State-Defense debate characteristic of some previous administrations. This difference was expressed by Secretary Vance in a May 1978 memorandum to the President. "Increasingly," he wrote:

> * * * we are faced with two different views of the U.S.-Soviet relationship; although so far we have managed to combine the two in our public statements, it is becoming more difficult to do. We have always recognized that the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union has been a combination of cooperation and

[11] Watts and Free, as quoted in Barnet, Real Security, p. 51.
[12] Platt, The Politics of Arms Control, p. 165.
[13] Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoris of a President. New York, Bantam Books, 1982, p. 232.

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competition, with the competition not preventing either side from seeking agreements in our mutual benefit in such areas as SALT. Now, however, we are coming to the point where there is growing pressure on the part of some people to have us portray the competitive aspects of the relationship as taking clear precedence over the search for areas of cooperation.[14]

The policy differences between Brzezinski and Vance were aired in public and at various times the administration seemed to be conveying contradictory signals on U.S.-Soviet relations. Public revelation of the differences constituted an additional element in the environment within which SALT policy was made.

Impact on Negotiations

Concern over the impact of congressional critics of SALT on subsequent ratification, coupled with the internal dynamics of the administration, led to a delay in the completion of SALT II. One analyst, for example, has argued that the Carter administration erred because it "never truly sensed the urgency of moving quickly to conclude SALT II and have it ratified. . . . As an operational matter . . . there was no pervasive sense of urgency among most of the senior officials working directly on SALT, and, in truth, several initiatives were adopted in 1977–78 that significantly prolonged and complicated the SALT negotiations." [15] The March 1977 comprehensive proposal for deep cuts was one such initiative, and a brief discussion of it will demonstrate some of the dynamics at work in the Carter years.

One of the earliest decisions that the new administration had to make on SALT was what proposal to make to the Soviets. The Vladivostok Accord that Carter inherited was the result of a meeting between Gerald Ford and Leonid Brezhnev in November 1974. At that meeting there was agreement that the two countries should pursue a treaty setting equal limits of 2,400 strategic nuclear launchers and establishing a subceiling of 1,320 for launchers with multiple warheads. In addition, the Soviets agreed to exclude forward-based systems and the United States agreed to abandon its attempt to get the Soviets to reduce their level of heavy missiles. Two problem areas after Vladivostok were the Soviet Backfire bomber (should it be counted as a heavy bomber?) and U.S. cruise missiles (what constraints should be placed on them, especially those on bombers?) [16]

There were, as Vance has described, two basic options facing the Carter administration. The first was to forge an agreement based on Vladivostok, probably postponing Backfire and cruise missiles until SALT III. The second was "to take a bold step which would move us beyond the simple numerical limits of Vladivostok to deep cuts. . . ." [17] Vance and Warnke favored the first option so as to reach an agreement during "the traditional honeymoon with Congress." This would "provide a more stable foundation for U.S.-Soviet relations in what could well be a rough period ahead." [18]

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[14] Brzezinski. Power and Principle, pp. 319–320. For Secretary Vance's account, see Vance, Cyrus. Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1983, pp. 100–102.
[15] Platt, The Politics of Arms Control, p. 171.
[16] Talbott, Endgame, pp. 32–35.
[17] Vance, Hard Choices, p. 48. Also see Talbott, Endgame, pp. 46–47.
[18] Vance, Hard Choices, p. 49.

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Others, including Brown, Brzezinski, and the President, favored a more far-reaching proposal.

There were a number of reasons adduced in support of the deep cuts proposal. Some were strategic in nature and centered around the growing vulnerability of U.S. land-based missiles if Soviet capabilities and U.S. weapons remained unchanged. There was also Jimmy Carter's "profound commitment to reversing, not simply curbing, the upward spiral of nuclear weapons." [19] The President was instinctively drawn to a more far-reaching proposal than the simple Vladivostok option. Finally, there were political reasons for going beyond Vladivostok. The Carter administration was extremely solicitous of Senator Henry Jackson in 1977, for his support would be important in any ratification debate. He and his assistant, Richard Perle, had sent the President a memorandum criticizing Vladivostok and advocating deep cuts in Soviet heavy missiles. One close student of SALT concluded that "the Jackson-Perle memo unquestionably reinforced the instincts of Carter, Brown, Brzezinski, and David Aaron to seek more than a mere consummation of the Vladivostock accord." [20]

When Vance left for Moscow, he had more than the comprehensive/deep cuts proposal with him. Concerned about a possible Soviet rejection of this, and still wanting a quick agreement, Vance had pressed for a fallback position that would accept the ceilings established at Vladivostok while deferring the Backfire and cruise missile issues. Carter authorized presentation of both the comprehensive and the deferral proposals, although Vance was instructed to make clear that Carter "personally preferred deep cuts now." [21]

The decision to offer both proposals reduced the pressure on the Soviets to accept the deep cuts idea as a basis for negotiation. Carter himself publicly reduced whatever such pressure existed by telling a press conference shortly before Vance left for Moscow that "if we're disappointed [by Soviet rejection of the comprehensive proposal]—which is a possibility—then we'll modify our stance." [22]

The Soviets rejected the proposal put before them in March by Secretary Vance, and it was some time before the talks were resumed. One cost of the comprehensive proposal was this delay until the fall of 1977. A second cost (and one judged by Secretary Vance to be the most serious one) was that the deep cuts proposal became a standard against which the eventual SALT II treaty was judged by its critics. The significance of the actual agreement was therefore diminished. A third possible cost was creation of a Soviet perception that the new administration lacked resolve in so swiftly abandoning its new comprehensive proposal.

Secretary Vance has described how, when talks resumed, further delays occurred. Some around the President, Vance has written, "recommended that we deliberately slow down the negotiations and toughen our positions" so as to counteract charges that the administration was too eager for an agreement. Although President

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[19] Ibid., p. 51.

[20] Talbott, Endgame, p. 54; Vance also notes the impact of the Jackson memo, Hard choices, p. 51. For Carter's account of the comprehensive proposal, see Keeping Faith, pp. 216–219.

[21] Vance, Hard Choices, p. 52.

[22] Talbott, Endgame, p. 67.

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Carter rejected this advice, some offering it "did succeed in slowing down the process, partly by making adjustments in U.S. negotiating positions more difficult. They did so by exacerbating public concerns over Soviet activities in Africa and elsewhere, and by creating a de facto political linkage between SALT and worsening United States-Soviet relations." [23]

As the negotiations continued without a final agreement and the Soviets moved aggressively in the Third World, the domestic climate for SALT deteriorated. By the winter of 1978–79, Vance reports that "virtually every remaining [SALT] issue, however technical or abstruse, had to be considered by the Special Coordinating Committee and often by the President himself. Adjustments in the U.S. position had to be weighed in terms of how we could defend it against claims that what was in fact a rational negotiating compromise was a political 'concession,' made for the sake of getting a treaty." [24] This passage graphically depicts the impact of the political environment on U.S. decisionmaking.

Brzezinski has written about Vance and himself that "it would be wrong to exaggerate the degree of our internal disagreements. Vance and I continued to work closely together on behalf of SALT, and we both desired a positive outcome, *though Vance certainly felt more strongly about it.*" (Italics added.) [25] While Brzezinski may be correct in warning against exaggerating policy differences, the evidence suggests that internal differences and bureaucratic conflict played a role in lengthening the negotiations. To the extent that this is so, it is significant, for the delay in concluding SALT II put the ratification debate into a time frame singularly inauspicious for success.

The March 1977 comprehensive proposal was a major departure from previous approaches in SALT. At a general level, it is an example of an administration seeking to pursue a distinctively new approach rather than continue with the policies it inherited. New approaches are sometimes needed, and they sometimes succeed in achieving the intended goal. In this case, however, the result was a delay in completing the SALT II treaty—a delay exacerbated by internal differences and bureaucratic conflict. The principal significance of the delay is that by the time the treaty was completed, the international and domestic environments had evolved in ways that made ratification more difficult than it would have been if the treaty had been finished earlier.

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[23] Vance, Hard Choices, p. 63. This is an unmistakable reference to the Vance-Brzezinski dispute over linkage. For Brzezinski's account, see Power and Principle, pp. 185–186.
[24] Vance, Hard Choices, p. 112.
[25] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 321.

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V. START AND INF

Policy Formulation

POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

It would be difficult to exaggerate the differences between Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter on the inter-related issues of arms control and United States-Soviet relations. Reagan had opposed each of the agreements discussed thus far in this report. He had dismissed SALT II in particular as "fatally flawed." Thus, when he became President in 1981, his administration had no sense of urgency about resuming arms talks with the Soviets. The emphasis, instead, was on domestic economic reform and a major defense buildup. Neither Congress nor public opinion in the United States placed significant constraints on the ability of the new administration to pursue this agenda.[1]

If the Reagan administration felt no compulsion to discuss strategic arms with the Soviets, there was another category of weaponry in which the political dynamics were more complicated. In December 1979 NATO had decided to deploy 572 new theater nuclear systems (464 ground-launched cruise missiles—or GLCMs—and 108 Pershing IIs) in response to the Soviet deployment of such new systems as the mobile, multiple warhead SS-20. Because NATO deployments would not begin until the end of 1983, an integral part of the decision was the holding of arms control talks on theater nuclear forces while preparations for deployment went forward. These talks had actually begun in the fall of 1980 but were adjourned after Jimmy Carter was defeated.

Because the governments and publics of the concerned European nations were as interested in the arms control track of the 1979 "dual track" decision as they were in the deployment track, the Reagan administration came under pressure in its first year to open arms talks with the Soviets on what were now called interme-

[1] Because the events discussed in this section occurred so recently, and because most of the officials who dealt with arms control in the first Reagan administration are still in office, there is very little documentation currently available on the internal dynamics of policymaking from 1981-84. A conspicuous exception is Strobe Talbott's Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1984. Much of the discussion in this section is based on Talbott's book. The diplomatic correspondent of "Time" when the book was written, Talbott is now Washington Bureau Chief of the magazine. A specialist on arms control, he wrote an earlier book on SALT II—Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II. New York, Harper & Row, 1979.

It should be noted that "Deadly Gambits" is not without its critics. Theodore Draper has written the most interesting critique. Draper, Theodore. Journalism, History and Journalistic History. New York Times Book Review, Dec. 9, 1984, pp. 3 and 32-34. But also see the responses to this review, including one by Paul Nitze, in New York Times Book Review, Dec. 16, 1984, pp. 28-29.

Before deciding to rely on Deadly Gambits in this section, the author asked a number of individuals who had served in or worked with the Reagan administration if the book described a world which they recognized. They answered in the affirmative. Moreover, Talbott's overall portrait is consistent with newspaper coverage of arms control in 1981-84.

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diate-range nuclear forces (INF). It was not until 1982, when there were signs that the American public was concerned about the lack of negotiations on strategic arms, that the administration moved on that issue as well. Thus, by the summer of 1982 the United States was involved in two negotiations in Geneva—one on INF and one on strategic weapons (renamed the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, or START).

Carter and Reagan faced different problems in their respective political environments. President Carter and his top arms control advisers wanted to conclude an arms control agreement with the Soviets and were concerned about various groups and individuals likely to oppose ratification of a SALT II treaty. Among the critics were the Committee on the Present Danger and legislators such as Senator Henry Jackson (and his chief aide, Richard Perle). Based on his record prior to 1981, his lack of interest in arms control issues as President, and the leisurely pace adopted in preparing for new arms talks, Reagan lacked Carter's commitment to early conclusion of a treaty. Moreover, many of those whom Carter feared would be opponents of SALT II were given important positions in the Reagan administration. This was especially true of the Committee on the Present Danger. Eugene Rostow was named to head ACDA, for example, and Paul Nitze was eventually chosen as the chief INF negotiator. Jackson's aide, Richard Perle, was named Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

One might say that the ideological polarities of the principal actors in and external to the government were reversed in the Carter and Reagan administrations. The Carter administration was staffed in the main with individuals who believed that arms control could play a constructive role in U.S. national security policy. On the outside were conservative critics who were profoundly skeptical of arms control. The Reagan administration has been staffed in the main with these conservative critics. On the outside are liberals and moderates who believe that the Reagan administration was irresponsible in its rejection of arms control.

BUREAUCRATIC CONFLICT

Ronald Reagan was as determined as Jimmy Carter to avoid a Kissingerian policy-making structure. Reagan's first national security adviser, Richard Allen, did not even report directly to the President. While Allen was in office, the NSC staff did not effectively coordinate the work of the various departments.[2] The resulting vacuum at the NSC was filled by the strong personalities at State and Defense.

In the Reagan administration, unlike its predecessor, there was seldom a State-ACDA alliance on arms control. Instead, it was more often a case of OSD and ACDA versus State (the latter sometimes, at least in 1981–82, supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff). ACDA was headed by one of SALT II's most formidable critics, Eugene Rostow. The new Secretary of State was Alexander Haig. Although he had testified against SALT II, Haig had served with Kissinger and, more so than any other top Reagan official, was

[2] Talbott, Deadly Gambits, p. 11.

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willing to listen to arguments on behalf of arms control. Moreover, he was served by Richard Burt as Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. As will be discussed below, Burt saw more utility in negotiating on strategic and intermediate forces than most other civilian officials in the administration.

The Defense Department was headed by Caspar Weinberger, who had no prior experience with arms control. This policy area became the responsibility of Richard Perle. The most important remaining set of actors was the Joint Chiefs. As Talbott describes them they "were the Administration's only high-level holdovers from the Carter period; they had endorsed SALT II; they were acutely conscious of being the odd men out, relative doves in an extremely hawkish Administration." [3]

Kissinger used an inter-agency group, the Verification Panel, as one means of controlling SALT policy. In a different way, the Special Coordinating Committee was important in the Carter years as a way of presenting options to the President and resolving differences between the various actors. In the Reagan administration the inter-agency groups constituted the crucial battleground over arms control. Alexander Haig has described their importance:

> In organizational terms, the key to the system is the substructure of SIG's [Senior Inter-Agency Groups] and IG's [Inter-Agency Groups] in which the fundamentals of policy . . . are decided. . . . In foreign policy, this process may involve the development of a policy toward an entire country or the examination of a single issue. . . . When the study is completed, options go forward to the President and he decides which option to approve. . . . There is a certain efficiency in this process. Built into it also is a high degree of bureaucratic competition and tension.[4]

The organizational structure was basically the same for both the INF and the START negotiations. Richard Burt and Richard Perle were co-chairmen of the INF Inter-Agency Group whose job it was to formulate options. Burt was chairman of the START IG. Of the two, Perle was better situated to influence policy because Weinberger was closer to Reagan than was Haig. Because Weinberger largely deferred to Perle's judgments about arms control, Perle had an extraordinary amount of influence. In Talbott's interpretation, "Perle ended up having more impact on policy in arms control than any other official in the U.S. government, an achievement that was all the more remarkable in that he held a third-echelon job." [5]

While the organizational structures for INF and START were substantially the same, the delegations in Geneva played quite different roles. This was due to the personal characteristics of the respective chief negotiators. The INF negotiator, Paul Nitze, had opposed SALT II, but he had more experience in national security affairs than anyone else in the entire administration. He could (and did) take independent initiatives in attempting to find common ground with the Soviets. The START negotiator, Edward Rowny, had resigned as the JCS representative on the SALT II delegation and had opposed ratification of the treaty. He ridiculed the arms control process and in Talbott's judgment, he was "almost as much

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[3] Ibid., p. 68.
[4] Haig, Alexander M. Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy. New York, MacMillan, 1984, p. 60.
[5] Talbott, Deadly Gambits, p. 17.

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of an obstacle to the achievement of a new agreement as he had been to the ratification of the old one." [6]

Impact on Negotiations: INF

At the beginning of 1981, the State Department, concerned that the Reagan administration would harm the NATO alliance by backing away from the December 1979 dual track decision, succeeded in getting the President to reaffirm U.S. support for it. Growing opposition in Europe to the deployment of the new weapons also made it prudent for the United States to move forward on the arms control track of the 1979 decision. Secretary of State Haig committed the United States to begin negotiations by the end of the year. This commitment became important, as Talbott sees it, because "a deadline was the only thing that would force the U.S. government, and eventually the President, to overcome the inertia of a divided bureaucracy." [7] The principal issue that divided the government in the summer was what the U.S. position should be.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, in the person of Richard Perle, favored the zero option in which the United States would propose foregoing GLCM and Pershing II deployments in exchange for Soviet reduction of its SS–20s to zero. Under this scenario, there would be no fallback position. The United States would insist on zero on both sides. The State Department, mainly in the person of Richard Burt, supported initial presentation of the zero option but sought to retain the flexibility to propose an agreement in which both sides might have some new intermediate weapons.[8] President Reagan considered the issue at an NSC meeting on November 12. Although he seemed to decide in favor of the Pentagon zero-only proposal, according to Talbott, at several points the President "assured Haig that the U.S. would negotiate 'in good faith.' " [9]

The ambiguity of President Reagan's decision led to discord between State and Defense, with Haig suggesting that the United States would be flexible, while Perle testified before a Senate committee that the choice was all 572 American missiles or none of them.[10] When the negotiations began in November of 1981 the Perle line largely prevailed. In tandem with Soviet intransigence, the inflexible U.S. position made progress unlikely.

By the summer of 1982 Paul Nitze had come to believe that progress was essential "not so much for the sake of arms control, for which he was no great enthusiast, but for the sake of American political and military interests, particularly in NATO." [11] The European allies were, in Nitze's view, coming to doubt the sincerity of the United States in the INF talks. It was this concern which is thought to have led Nitze to open his own back channel—direct, private talks with the Soviet negotiator, Yuli Kvitsinsky. In several

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[6] Ibid., p. 210.
[7] Ibid., pp. 49 and 51.
[8] There was differing motivations for supporting the same position in Burt's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and the European Bureau. Burt reportedly thought it unlikely that an agreement would be reached, but thought it important for maintaining NATO unity for the United States to appear flexible. The European Bureau was more optimistic that, with a flexible approach, an agreement could be reached. Ibid., pp. 81–82.
[9] Ibid., pp. 61–63 and 72–74.
[10] Ibid., p. 83.
[11] Ibid., p. 115.

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conversations, which the press later called the "walk in the woods," Nitze and Kvitsinsky discussed the potential for finding common ground. Using a formula whereby either side could disavow the results of the informal talks, the two negotiators discussed the possibility of American abandonment of Pershing II deployments and a Soviet reduction of SS-20s by two-thirds. The United States would deploy 300 GLCM launchers to offset the remaining 75 SS-20s (which, with three warheads each, would give the Soviets 225 warheads to the American's 300).[12]

By the summer of 1982 Richard Allen had been replaced by William Clark as National Security Adviser, and it fell to Clark's deputy, Robert McFarlane, to deal with many of the details of arms control. There was concern about Nitze's having "wandered off the reservation," discussing possible solutions without approval from (or even the knowledge of) his superiors. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not dismiss the proposed deal out of hand, and although Secretary of State Shultz and ACDA Director Rostow supported Nitze's initiative, the President agreed with the Office of the Secretary of Defense that the United States should still insist on the "zero-only" position.[13] The Soviet leadership failed to respond to the initiative as well, and no progress was made in the INF talks before the initial deployment of NATO weapons in November 1983 and the Soviet termination of the negotiations.

Impact on Negotiations: START

Unlike intermediate nuclear forces, the issue of strategic forces and their control (or reduction) has a long history. Thus, as Talbott summarized it, START at one level was "the story of old battles from SALT refought with new intensity, with higher stakes, and with some of the original combatants, who had come back to fight again another day in new, more powerful positions."[14] The new name reflected a new emphasis: reducing rather than limiting strategic arms.

By the spring of 1982 pressure was building on the administration to begin negotiations on strategic arms. The nuclear freeze movement was beginning to pick up momentum both in Congress and in public opinion. When the bureaucracy set about the task of formulating an opening proposal, there were three major alternatives. (A fourth, by General Rowny, was sufficiently similar to the OSD-ACDA proposals that it is not discussed here.)

The OSD position, formulated by Perle, was designed to rectify the deficiencies of SALT by beginning to address four features of Soviet forces which, in the aggregate, posed the greatest threat to U.S. forces: "too many warheads that were too large atop too many missiles with too much cumulative throw-weight."[15] The proposal focused on a ballistic missile warhead ceiling at about half the number then deployed by each side (4000) and a ballistic missile throw-weight ceiling set approximately at the U.S. level (and con-

[12] Ibid., p. 125. There were other important aspects of the proposed agreement, but because this chapter focuses on internal aspects of arms control, these will not be discussed here.
[13] Ibid., pp. 137-144.
[14] Ibid., p. 234.
[15] Ibid.

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siderably below the Soviet level). Under this proposal the United States would be able to continue to modernize its arsenal with MX and Trident II, but the Soviets "would have to remove about two-thirds of their most modern, MIRVed" ICBMs.[16]

The overall thrust of Perle's proposal was supported by ACDA, which also suggested a 4000 warhead ceiling. ACDA approached the task of reducing throw-weight by limiting the weight of each warhead, but this too would have required significant reductions in the number of Soviet ICBMs. The initial START proposal was one of the issues on which the State-ACDA alliance of SALT I and the Carter period of SALT II was replaced by an OSD-ACDA alliance.[17]

The third plan was that of the State Department. It was largely the work of Richard Burt. While Burt, according to Talbott, argued for a flexible negotiating position in INF more for NATO than for United States-Soviet reasons (for he did not believe an agreement was at all likely), on START he believed that the two sides could find common ground. He thus opposed couching a proposal in terms of throw-weight because to do so "would make the proposal non-negotiable." Burt emphasized limits on launchers and warheads (1200 ballistic missile launchers, 5000 ballistic missile warheads, and 2500 ICBM warheads).[18]

The Joint Chiefs ended up supporting the State Department's approach, although they wanted (and obtained) a launcher limit of 850 instead of 1,200.[19] This led to a serious split between OSD and ACDA on the one hand and State and JCS on the other. Reportedly, to prevent the President from being faced with such a stark choice, Burt devised a compromise: a two-phase negotiation in which the State-JCS launcher/warhead limits would be the aim of the first phase and the OSD-ACDA throw-weight limits the goal of phase two. According to Talbott's account, James Baker, the White House Chief of Staff, was worried about the nuclear freeze movement and consequently talked with Burt. McFarlane was leaning in Burt's direction as well. Although the National Security Decision Directive announcing the President's decision was not all that State and JCS wanted, it did accept the basic two-phase structure.[20] As Alexander Haig summarized it:

> In the interdepartmental meetings to establish administration policy on START, the Department of Defense was understandably preoccupied with the disparity in destructive power. . . . At the same time, [State] tried to adhere as closely as possible to SALT II, while identifying and correcting its flaws. In the end, the President decided . . . to give each supplicant half the baby.[21]

In the winter of 1982–83, the administration's proposed basing mode for the MX missile came under heavy congressional fire at the same time that there was growing concern that the administration was not negotiating seriously at START. At this point the administration formed the President's Commission on Strategic Forces (the Scowcroft Commission). As 1983 unfolded, a group of

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[16] Ibid., p. 235.
[17] Ibid., p. 236.
[18] Ibid., p. 248.
[19] For the complicated reasons which led the JCS to this position, see Ibid., pp. 253–262.
[20] Ibid., pp. 263–270.
[21] Haig, Caveat, pp. 222–223.

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Congressmen and Senators was able to use the framework suggested by the Scowcroft Commission and support for MX funding as leverage to obtain changes in the administration's START position. This exercise culminated in the revised START proposal of October 1983 which incorporated provisions for a "double build-down." [22]

Alexander Haig has set forth his view of the problems which plagued the Reagan administration in 1981 and 1982:

> Unfortunately, the arms control progress, like so many of the Administration's security-related and domestic initiatives in the early stages, suffered from the lack of a disciplined interdepartmental policy-making structure. The failure to delineate responsibilities clearly, or to establish bureaucratic authority at the outset, generated confusion and liberated a cacophony of vested interests that ultimately affected the quality of policy recommendations to the President. In arms control, the result was a flawed START position. Conceptual clarity was only achieved two years afterward with the formation of the bipartisan Scowcroft Commission.[23]

While Haig's general conclusions are consonant with other available evidence (e.g., journalistic accounts), Haig is more diplomatic than many other observers. He does not specify the source of the lack of disciplined policymaking. Yet the source seems to be the President himself. Except in those few matters to which he assigns top priority, Ronald Reagan seems more remote in his control of the government than any other President discussed in this report. His willingness to delegate substantive matters to subordinates and his seeming lack of knowledge about the major issues at stake in arms control suggest that arms control has not been a top priority. Moreover, in the first term at least, he lacked a national security adviser with knowledge or clout sufficient enough to permit Presidential delegation of responsibility for imposing control. This may have reflected a Presidential disinclination to pursue arms control negotiations seriously until the administration's defense buildup was strongly established. It is clear that in the absence of central direction the "cacophony of vested interests" that Haig describes did dominate.

Toward the end of his second term, President Eisenhower was finally moving to impose control on the warring factions in his administration. By the time he did so, however, it was too late to complete arms control agreements with the USSR. The U-2 intervened. It remains to be seen if President Reagan will pursue a meaningful arms control agreement as a matter of overriding priority and impose order on his administration in time to reach such an agreement with the Soviets during his second term.

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[22] U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Congress, Arms Control, and Weapons Modernization [by] Robert C. Gray. In Congress and Foreign Policy 1983. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984, pp. 86–109.

[23] Haig, Caveat, p. 223.

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VI. CONCLUSIONS

Because of the many variables and unique circumstances of each negotiation, one must be cautious in drawing broad generalizations. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that this report has focused only on American internal and domestic factors. A successful negotiation, of course, requires a negotiating partner who is also willing (and able) to compromise in search of an agreement and an absence of major disruptions external to both.

Still, some lessons emerge from the cases considered here.

1. The role of White House leadership.—The government consists of a number of separate agencies that bring varying and sometimes conflicting perspectives to issues such as arms control. In the absence of leadership from the President, a strong national security adviser, or some other central figure backed with Presidential authority, it is unlikely that a U.S. negotiating position (or an agreement with another nation) will be reached.

Two models of White House leadership emerge from this report. The first is one of direct Presidential involvement. Having familiarized themselves with the details of the negotiations, Kennedy and Carter were personally involved in monitoring progress in the Test Ban and SALT II. The second model is one of a strong national security adviser who is invested by the President with sufficient authority to impose order on the government. Henry Kissinger under Richard Nixon is the pre-eminent example of this.

Neither of these approaches to White House control guarantees success. In the Carter case, for example, sufficient authority was exercised by the President such that agreement with the Soviets was reached, but there were delays in the process that pushed the ratification debate into a difficult political period. In the Kissinger case, the national security adviser circumvented the bureaucracy by secretly and successfully negotiating with the Soviets. However, he agreed to positions that complicated subsequent negotiation of both SALT I and SALT II, positions that, it is argued, could have been improved with benefit of thorough staff analysis.

If White House control is not a sufficient condition of success, however, it may be a necessary one. In the Eisenhower and first Reagan administrations, the lack of White House authority (whether exerted by the President or a powerful subordinate) allowed the warring factions to delay and obstruct the formulation of negotiable proposals. By the time Eisenhower, over the objections of DOD and AEC, finally seemed willing to commit Presidential resources to the negotiation of a test ban, it was too late. In the first Reagan administration, the vacuum at the top in knowledge and experience, coupled with the apparently low priority the President attached to arms control, enabled or required Assistant Secretaries to formulate policy. It is generally easier to prevent the government from acting than it is to cause it to act, and it is no surprise that

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intelligent, politically sophisticated officials are capable of obstructing the negotiating process.

The issue of White House leadership poses a dilemma. On the one hand it seems necessary to bring order to the government. On the other hand it is subject to abuse. If, for example, power becomes so concentrated in the person of the national security assistant that he can negotiate without technical support or policy input from the departments, the negotiating process may actually be made more complex. Or—in a worst case scenario—agreements may be reached which, because they have not been thoroughly studied by the relevant departments, are not in the best interest of the nation.

2. Coordinating weapons acquisition and arms control.—Few issues have been as vexing as that of developing mechanisms for better coordinating arms control negotiations on the one hand with ongoing development and deployment of weapons on the other. For example, in the Kissinger years, decisions to place sophisticated multiple warheads (MIRVs) on ballistic missiles were apparently taken in a channel wholly separate from the Verification Panel. This made whatever small chance there was to reach an agreement curtailing MIRVs even more remote.

The examples of imperfect coordination do not always concern deployment of new weapons. The Carter administration's decision unilaterally to terminate the B–1 bomber program in favor of air-launched cruise missiles is arguably an instance of a questionably managed *cancellation* of a major weapons system. Domestically, this decision reinforced perceptions that the administration was insufficiently attentive to the nation's defenses—a perception that complicated the environment in which SALT II was considered. Internationally, the decision may have led the Soviets (and others) to wonder about the bargaining resolve of the administration.

This is not to say that unilateral action is never useful. President Kennedy made effective use of such action by unilaterally ceasing atmospheric tests in 1963. But he placed this action in a broader framework by giving the American University speech, which was explicitly designed to promote U.S.-Soviet cooperation. Where the Carter administration may well have erred was in neither seeking to use the B–1 for bargaining purposes in SALT II *nor* in attempting to create a larger arms control framework within which the unilateral cancellation would be placed.

3. The problems of democracy.—In addition to such problems as controlling the various agencies of government and attempting to coordinate arms control and weapons acquisition, there is a more fundamental point that seems to be the unique province of American democracy. Quadrennial Presidential elections pose a number of complications for many foreign policy ventures, including arms control negotiations.

One such complication is the temptation for an incumbent to conclude an agreement before the next election so as to enhance re-election prospects (Nixon in 1972) or to establish his place in history (Johnson in 1968). This temptation may at times be a significant negotiating liability, for if (as seems almost certain) the negotiating partner perceives the quadrennial dynamic, it may, by waiting until the fourth year of an administration, be able to extract

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concessions otherwise unobtainable. The opposite problem is one in which the advent of an election year makes conclusion of an arms control agreement politically impossible. Challenged from his right by Ronald Reagan in 1976, President Ford was in no position to move forward with SALT that year. The manner in which elections affect negotiations is determined by the passions and issues of the day. What is recurrent is the interjection of election year politics into arms control (and other) negotiating forums.

A second broad complication created by a democratic form of government is that competitive elections often feature promises of change. Ronald Reagan ran openly against SALT II, a treaty already signed by the U.S. and Soviet Presidents. The measured approach adopted by the Reagan administration in developing new proposals reflected its judgment that the top priority was building up U.S. military strength, not ratifying SALT II or proceeding quickly to negotiation of another agreement. The Carter March 1977 comprehensive proposal is another example of an administration attempting to distinguish its efforts from those of its predecessor rather than to build on those efforts. Such policy shifts from one administration to the next make it difficult for the United States to follow a coherent medium-term (let alone, long-term) strategy, an unpleasant fact that at times gives our adversaries tactical advantages in the conduct of diplomacy.

Because arms control has become such a controversial issue in American political life, it is particularly susceptible to the problems discussed above. In the absence of a national consensus on the proper foreign policy objectives of the United States, the policy oscillations experienced in recent years may continue. Although questions of bureaucratic organization matter a great deal (and to some extent reflect the wider debate in society), the most significant question facing the United States in the near future is whether it is possible to construct elements of a national consensus on the interrelated issues of arms control and force modernization.

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